H. The United Nations Charter and NATO Practice in the Area of Peace and Security
The first and most evident legal problem raised by Annex 1-A is that although Article 53 of the United Nations Charter provides that '[t]he Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilise such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority', and although Article I,la of Annex 1-A invites the Security Council to do precisely that, NATO is not a regional organisation 10 designed to undertake peace-enforcement or peace-keeping operations, however consensual these may be. The North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 11 was firmly based on the provisions of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which recognises the 'inherent 
right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a
Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security'. On the face of it, the North Atlantic Treaty, therefore, comes into effect when the Security Council has not exercised its primary responsibility to maintain (or -more properly-to restore) international peace and security, and even then exclusively until the Security Council does so.
Regional organisations, on the other hand, do have the authority of 'dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action'.
12 These measures may include consensual peacekeeping operations undertaken independently from the authority of the Security Council. In fact. States members of such regional organisations are required to 'make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council'. 13 It is an open question whether even peace-keeping operations by genuine regional organisations would be a legitimate measure for the maintenance of international peace and security when the State receiving peace-keeping forces is not a member of such organisation. Of course there is nothing to prevent States from doing jointly what they are allowed to do individually under international law. But in any case, the implementation of Annexes 1-A and 2 is not entirely a peacekeeping operation within the technical meaning of the term in international law. The Peace Agreement is perhaps the prime example of what the United Nations Secretary-General has labelled 'multi-functional peacekeeping operations', 14 which are based on the political commitment to peace at the highest level of authority of the parties to the dispute, but which may not have the full support of local authorities or forces, and therefore may need a more robust mandate to implement the undertakings of the parties.
In fact, although the Peace Agreement is based on the consent of the Parties, it may involve military enforcement of some provisions, including the use of necessary force to ensure compliance. Hence the need of a Security Council resolution authorising Member States to 'take all necessary measures to effect the implementation of and to ensure compliance with Annex 1-A of the Peace Agreement'.
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The Security Council, conscious -one would assume-of the inappropriateness of the reference to regional organisations in Annex 1-A, does not take up the suggestion implied in Annex 1-A of using Article 53 (Chapter VIII) of the United Nations Charter by authorising NATO to act as a regional organisation to implement Annex 1-A. Rather, the Security Council resolution 1031 generically refers to Chapter VH and authorises Member States 'through or in co-operation with the organisation 
in. The Peace Agreement and NATO
The implementation of the Peace Agreement, therefore, is not the first peaceenforcement action of NATO as an Alliance under the authority of the Security Council. However, the sheer scale of operation undertaken pursuant to SCR 1031, as well as the fact that NATO will provide political and military leadership to IFOR as a whole, rather than co-operating with existing (multi-functional or traditional) United Nations peace-keeping forces such as UNPROFOR, warrants a closer examination of the legal nature of the role of NATO within IFOR and how this may affect the obligations of member States contributing to IFOR. Resolution 1031 of the Security Council authorised Member States of the United Nations to 'take all necessary measures to effect the implementation of and to ensure compliance with Annex 1-A of the Peace Agreement' 21 under unified command and control. 22 It is necessary to stress that SCR 1031 assigns the unified command and control of contributing States to IFOR, a coalition force established 'through or in co-operation with' NATO, but not identical to it.
23 Under SCR 1031 NATO is responsible for establishing IFOR, while Annex 1-A 24 goes much further by envisaging that 'IFOR will operate under the authority and subject to the direction and political control of the North Atlantic Council ... through the NATO chain of command'.
Unified command, however, is a standard feature of many multinational military operations and does not depend necessarily on the direction or political guidance of a particular organisation. Even if the Security Council had relinquished part of its political control of the IFOR operation to the North Atlantic Council, by entrusting NATO with the responsibility of establishing IFOR in co-operation with other member States, such an abdication would not relieve member States participating in the operation from the primary accountability to the Security Council as the body authorising and mandating the operation. 25 of those were from NATO countries, there was no suggestion that the coalition operated any other authority but the Security Council's. Is there any difference in international law between the two coalitions?
Aside from the obvious differences of purpose of the two coalitions, from the point of view of the Security Council resolution authorising the use of necessary force, the main difference seems to be that in resolution 678, the contributing States were 'co-operating with the Government of Kuwait' 27 , while in resolution 1031 they are asked to co-ordinate with NATO rather than with the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in fact, had already negotiated before IFOR's deployment -indeed before SCR 1031 was approved-a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with NATO. 28 The SOFA grants NATO personnel unprecedented privileges and immunities, including 'the right of bivouac, manoeuvre, billet, and utilisation of any areas or facilities as required for support, training, and operation'. Each contributing State is under the same obligations and has the same rights as if it were acting individually in accordance with the Security Council resolution. In short, IFOR troops are in Bosnia and Herzegovina under United Nations Security Council authority, and they are accountable only to the United Nations for their actions or omissions. However, the Security Council did make an important concession to the view of the diplomats in Dayton by requesting contributing States to act 'through or in co-operation with' NATO. This request is a concession to the political requirements of the negotiators in Dayton, and it is a direct consequence of the failure of the international community, including NATO countries, to react effectively to the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina thereby discrediting the United Nations in the eyes of both international public opinion and, more importantly, the opinion of the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In fact, the monitoring and enforcement actions undertaken by NATO described above have been perceived as one of the very few tangible reactions of the international community to the deliberate policies of destruction of some of the parties to the conflict. Even though these actions were undertaken under the authority and at the request of the United Nations Security Council and the United Nations military commanders on the ground, NATO became, in the eyes of the negotiators, the only possible guarantor of a territorial and military settlement which would last. Given the unfortunate track record of UNPF, maybe the most important contribution of NATO to the peace settlement was given well before the transfer of authority from UNPROFOR to IFOR: the confidence that any agreement could be enforced, with military force if necessary. 33 The purpose of NATO involvement seems to be at least in part that of giving credibility to the Peace Agreement, and reassuring the parties that necessary force can and will be used to enforce it. The other possible reason is that United States policy makers, having decided to commit a considerable number of US troops to enforce the settlement, needed a formula which would appease the strong isolationist section of their public opinion. They found it in NATO which acts as an umbrella and so avoids the risks, for the United States, of leading a coalition single-handedly, as it did effectively in Kuwait, thereby assuming responsibility for any possible shortcomings.
Aside from political considerations, however, NATO involvement is restricted to the co-ordination of United Nations Member States for the establishment of IFOR under unified command and control. 34 The fact that members of NATO are choosing to provide their troops and equipment under the NATO insigniae should not be confused with an intervention of NATO as an Alliance. NATO member States may be under an additional obligation to operate under NAC political control, independent of the Security Council resolution and of the Dayton Agreement. However any obligation owed to NATO as an organisation by any of its member States cannot take precedence over the obligations owed to the international community as a whole, or to the Security Council acting in its name. Both de jure and de facto NATO is a mere provider of C 3 I to IFOR, and each member State maintains individually its accountability to the Security Council as the mandating authority of the operation.
The de facto application of this principle is even clearer for troops contributed by non-NATO States, which are not represented at the strategic and political level of The important prerogative that NATO has de facto retained, in addition to providing C 3 I support to IFOR, is in the field of 'external relations' and consequently of political ascendancy. NATO has deliberately set out to make of this occasion a public relation success.
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IV. NATO and the Question of Co-operation with the ICTY
Perceptions contribute to reality even in international law. However, the obligations of Member States contributing to IFOR are not altered by either the Peace Agreement or the interpretation of it by NATO or the media. The issue of co-operation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 36 is an example of where the pre-existing obligations under international law of each contributing State to IFOR take precedence over NATO's perception of its role in the implementation of the Peace Agreement, and even NATO member States obligations towards the Organisation. The Peace Agreement grants to IFOR contributing States the right to use military force in the implementation of the Peace Agreement.
37 This has been interpreted by NATO itself as to include the power to arrest persons indicted by the ICTY. 38 Moreover, any questions of an arrest being a violation the sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina does not arise, as Bosnia and Herzegovina has explicitly waived this prerogative together with many more important others,
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NATO press conferences are held in Sarajevo daily and the transcripts are automatically generated and distributed throughout the world to press agencies and newspapers via the internet in a matter of hours. Every conference reports on the day by day progress of the operation, and the press officers seem to have been instructed to report as frankly as possible the difficulties as well as the success encountered during the day to day implementation of the Peace Agreement, including details of 'human interest' stories which attract the popular press. This generates such a volume of news that implementation is seen to be carried out whatever the actual state of affairs on the ground may be.
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Hereinafter ICTY. IFOR contributing States which are subject to the NATO chain of command, there may be an interesting conflict of obligations, if NAC -despite the agreements-was to deliberately refuse to authorise any active steps that may lead to the arrest of persons indicted by the Tribunal. On the one hand, in fact, they would be expected to follow the policy decided by NAC, as foreseen in the Peace Agreement, 46 on the other hand they would be under the international obligation to abide by SCR 827. However, it is clear that compliance with Security Council resolution 827 takes precedence over any obligations owed by member States to a particular Organisation.
Hence, it could be contended that, in so far as a contributing State is legitimately in control of the territory where an accused is known to reside, and is in practice able to arrest him or her, provided -of course-that it has received a warrant of arrest and order for surrender of that accused, the State is under the obligation to arrest the accused and transfer them to the Tribunal, irrespective of the terms of the Peace Agreement, and irrespective of the scope of its implementing legislation.
Of course, legal obligations can only be proportionate to the ability to comply with them. Hence, when the same arrest warrants were sent to the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, that Government could not have been held responsible for the failure to comply, 47 as they were not in the practical position to do so. Inability to comply with an obligation, however, should not be mistaken for an absence of obligation. At the time of writing, the ICTY has issued one international order of arrest, addressed to all States Members and non-members of the United Nations. 48 In addition, it has issued specific warrants of arrest for two accused to Switzerland, France, the United Kingdom and the United States. 49 These arrest warrants impart an obligation on the recipient State to 'promptly arrest and transfer' 50 an accused. This obligation is incumbent on States acting individually, but may be difficult to attribute to NATO as an organisation. While States have the right to do collectively what they can do individually, NATO as an organisation does not acquire necessarily the obligations of each of its Member States. This is why it is important that it be made clear that, from the point of view of international law, it is IFOR contributing States that are authorised to take military action in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina under SCR 1031, not NATO as an organisation, despite the fact that NATO has negotiated, in IFOR's name, the Agreements on the Status of Forces in Bosnia and States to an arrest warrant addressed to them would be their physical inability to comply, due, for example, to lack of the necessary military control over the relevant territory.
It is important that the obligation be perceived as such, in order for it not to remain dormant, and that any inability to comply reflects practical obstacles, not erroneous legal arguments based on domestic legislation or on the Peace Agreement or on NATO Rules of Engagement, none of which can derogate from orders of the International Tribunal. This is the essence of the universal jurisdiction of the Tribunal in respect of serious violations of international humanitarian law. It may well be argued that States' obligation to do their utmost to arrest accused persons arises independent of SCR 827 itself, and is based on the customary duty on all members of the international community to seek out and arrest 51 and consecutively aut dedere aut judicare 52 persons accused of serious violations of international humanitarian law.
The recent negotiations between NATO and the International Tribunal raise some hopes that IFOR will indeed co-operate with the Tribunal by guarding evidence, notably suspected mass-grave sites. 53 However, perhaps fearful of what the US journalists have already labelled 'mission creep', 54 NATO has not acknowledged that the duty of Member States to comply with arrest warrants or other orders of the Tribunal does not need to be included in the Peace Agreement but is incumbent upon them under SCR 827 and international law.
It may be that the state of the negotiations between the ICTY and IFOR is such that the Tribunal has decided not to remind NATO members of their obligations, or to do so confidentially, in order to obtain a better negotiating environment when discussing procedures for the transfer of persons that may be arrested in the future or logistic co-operation on the field for investigators. However, it is important to recognise that a specific order to IFOR contributing States for the arrest of an accused in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina under their control is a legitimate and le-" gaily valid option for the Tribunal. Such orders would be properly addressed to the 
